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AN ECONOMIST'S REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1951
WNTALTER W. HELLER*
T HE ECONOMIST, no less than the legal practitioner, finds the
individual income tax provisions the most interesting aspect of
the Revenue Act of 1951. Therefore, after briefly reviewing the
revenue impact of the Act as a whole, this commentary will focus
mainly on the income tax provisions. It will try to appraise briefly
the equity and economic rationality of Congress' action, especially
in terms of the charge that Congress has pushed us to, or over, the
brink of bearable taxation.
Revenue Impact
Seen in one light, the 1951 Act is the capstone of an heroic tax
effort by which Congress in less than 18 months added $15 billion
(at 1951 income levels) to the annual flow of federal tax revenues-
all but $1 billion of that amount representing increases in taxes
on individual and corporate incomes. The Revenue Act of 1951
accounted for $5.4 billion, the Revenue Act of 1950, $5.8 billion, and
the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, $3.5 billion.'
Seen in another light, the 1.951 Act sounded the death knell to
our pay-as-we-go national budgetary policy. In effect, the Congress
last year and the Administration this year have succumbed to deficit
financing to meet our defense needs. In the face of a budget deficit
of perhaps $10 billion and a cash deficit of perhaps $5 billion during
the current calendar year (even after taking into account budget
cuts being made by Congress). Congress has balked at further tax
increases, and the President has not pressed for action on even
the mild tax recommendations in his January Budget Message.
2
*B.A., Oberlin College, 1935; M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1938;
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1941. Social Science Research Fellow,
1939-40; Instructor, Univ. of Wis., 1941-42; fiscal economist, U. S. Treas-
ury, 1942-46 and consultant since 1946; asso. prof. of economics, Univ. of
Minn., 1946-50; professor since 1950; Chief of Internal Finance, U. S.
Military Government in Germany, 1947-48; staff consultant, Committee for
Economic Development, 1948-49.
1. For a succinct statement of the revenue effects and tax rate and base
changes in the three acts, see U. S. Treasury Department, Annual Report for
the Fiscal Year 1951, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952, pp. 44-52.
2. The chief differences between the conventional budget and the cash-
consolidated budget are that the latter includes trust fund operations and
treats interest on the public debt on a cash basis while the conventional budget
excludes trust funds and treats interest on an accrual basis. Payments into the
trust funds currently exceed disbursements by about $4.5 billion annually. The
cash-consolidated budget is presented each year in one of the special analyses
in the budget documents. See, for example, Special Analysis A, "Receipts from
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The 1951 action also signalled the end of the brief tax honey-
moon that existed between the Administration and Congress after
Korea. The 1950 Revenue Act met, almost to the letter, the re-
quests of the Administration. The Excess Profits Tax Act delivered
$3.5 billion of the $4 billion requested. In 1951, while still using
Treasury recommendations as a point of departure, Congress en-
acted only $5.4 billion against a requested $10.7 billion.3 Moreover,
the composition of the tax increase in the Act differed substantially
from the recommendations. Congress enacted less than one-fourth4
of the recommended excise tax increase of $3.2 billion, only three-
fifths of the Treasury proposal of a $4.2 billion increase in individual
income taxes, and two-thirds of the $3.2 billion increase proposed
for corporation taxes.5
Congress in fact enacted slightly over $6 billion of tax increases
but offset them in part with various tax concessions totalling about
$700 million annually. Individual income taxpayers will gain over
$300 million a year from the assortment of reliefs and reductions
discussed by Mr. O'Byrne in the preceding article., For example,
special treatment of capital gains on sales of personal residences will
save taxpayers about $110 million a'year; liberalizing of family
partnership provisions, $100 million; extension of roughly half of
the benefits of income splitting to qualifying heads of households,
$44 million; extension of capital gains treatment to breeding live-
stock, coal royalties, and growing crops sold with a farm, perhaps
$30 million. Corporations were given $100 million of additional
excess profits tax relief. The roughly $80 million of added allow-
ances under percentage depletion and mining development costs
also accrues largely to corporations. Last but hardly least are the
losses to the Treasury of $100 million by repeal of the electrical
energy tax and another $100 million by other excise tax reductions.7
None of the foregoing concessions was initiated by the Admin-
and Payments to the Public" in The Budget of the United States Govern-
ment for the Fiscal Year 1953, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952,
p. 1142.
3. Although President Truman originally foresaw a budget deficit of
$16.5 billion to be covered by additional taxes, the slackening of the pace of the
defense effort steadily shrank the prospective deficit. As a result, the antici-
pated "second bite" of the 1951 tax program failed to materialize.
4. The wagering tax is here excluded. Against estimates of $400 million
annually by Congressional experts and $300 million by the Treasury, actual
collections in the first seven months totaled only $3.5 millions according to
The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 1952.
5. U. S. Treasury, op. cit. supra note 1, at 470, 501.
6. 36 finn. L. Rev. 832, 834 et seq. (1952).
7. These revenue loss estimates were derived from exhibits in U. S.
Treasury, op. cit. supra note 1, at 477, 501-507.
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istration, and several were explicity denounced by President
Truman in signing the bill.8 A fairly close historical parallel is
not hard to find. After cooperating rather harmoniously with the
Administration in 1940 and 1941 and after enacting a large tax
increase: in 1942 in spite of growing differences with the Adminis-
tration, Congress balked almost completely in 1943. It gave Presi-
dent Roosevelt little more than a fifth of the $10.5 billion tax in-
crease he had sought and at the same time granted extensive tax
concessions. He reacted with an unprecedented veto, catigating
Congress for "providing relief not for the needy but for the
greedy," but his veto was overridden. 9
Economic Limits to Taxation
Reactions of Congressional leaders, Presidential aspirants, and
the taxpaying public to the Revenue Act of 1951--or, more accu-
rately, to the total tax burden as increased by that Act-strongly
suggest that the political limit of taxation has been reached, short
of total war. Both Chairman Doughton of the House Ways and
Means Committee and Chairman George of the Senate Finance
Committee are among those who have indicated that the 1951
legislation is about as far as we can go, short of war. Most of these
judgments rely heavily on the argument that further taxation will
have unfortunate if not disastrous economic consequences.Y° This
position appears to be untenable.
Among economists, Colin Clark of Australia is the most widely
cited exponent of the position that taxes beyond a certain point
become self-defeating. He suggests that when taxes rise above
roughly 25 per cent of the national income, they defeat themselves
by impairing production and causing inflation.11 Since total taxes in
the United States now exceed 30 per cent of national income, and
since many influential opponents of higher taxes have endorsed
8. In the "Statement by the President, October 20, 1951, upon signing
H.R. 4473, the Revenue Act of 1951," he said: "Furthermore, this legislation
does little to close the loopholes in present tax laws, and in some respects
provides additional means by which wealthy individuals can escape paying
their proper share of the national tax load through such devices as excessively
liberal 'capital gains' provisions, family partnerships, and excessive depletion
allowances on oil and gas and certain minerals properties."
9. "Message from the President of the United States returning without
approval the bill (H.R. 3687) entitled 'An act to provide revenue, and for
other purposes,'" February 22, 1944.
10. See, for example, the article by Senator Walter F. George in Look
Magazine, January 29, 1952.
11. The best-known statement of this thesis is in Clark's brief article,
The Danger Point in, Taxes, Harper's Magazine, December, 1950, pp. 67-69.
[Vol. 36:864
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Clark's thesis, its validity has become a significant issue in federal
tax policy.
Apart from citing a variety of statistics which are supposed to,
but do not in fact, establish his thesis, 2 Clark argues that 25 per
cent is the tax threshhold to inflation because that level, (1) busi-
ness, financial, and political leaders "transfer their allegiance" to
inflation; (2) employers' resistance to wasteful expenditures and
wage increases weakens; and (3) incentives to work and invest
are badly impaired. Implicitly, he is saying that further tax increases
reduce the output of goods and services more than they reduce the
flow of purchasing power seeking to buy those goods.
Nothing in recent U. S. output, consumption, and price statistics
appears to bear Clark's thesis out. The consumers' price index,
after rising from 170 at the time of Korea to 184 eight months later,
has held virtually steady since February, 1951. Gross national prod-
uct, meanwhile, moved up from $287.4 billion in the third quarter
of 1950 to $328.2 billion in the third quarter of 1951, and has since
risen by more than $10 billion during the period of relative price
stability. Meanwhile, consumer expenditures fell from the high
of $209 billion early in 1951, and have only recently regained this
level.33 In other words, the Revenue Act of 1951 and the other tax
increases since Korea may rather be said (a) not to have prevented
rapid growth in productivity of the American economy and (b) to
have helped curb consumer spending and check inflation.
Apparently, recent tax increases have not shifted allegiances to
inflation, nor is it easy to visualize how this would come about in
any event. This leaves for examination Clark's arguments about the
effects of taxes on business spending policies and on economic incen-
tives.
Prior to Korea, the basic corporation tax rate was 38 per cent;
action in 1950 raised this to 47 per cent and added a 30 per cent ex-
cess profits tax, with the proviso that the combined maximum ef-
fective rate was not to exceed 62 per cent. The 1951 Act raised the
12. A brief critical examination of the historical data which Clark
cites in support of his thesis is contained in the writer's testimony before
the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report in Hearings
on the Report of the President, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., January-February, 1952, pp. 315-325. A more compre-
hensive appraisal of Clark's statistics is presented by Joseph A. Pechman
and Thomas Mayer in an article to be published in the Review of Economics
and Statistics, Harvard University.
13. Data are taken from the monthly Economic Indicators, May, 1952,
Prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report by the Council
of Economic Advisers, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952, pp. 2, 3.
Dollar figures are given in terms of annual rates.
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basic rate to 52 per cent and the maximum effective rate to 70 per
cent. At present, then, the top rates on corporate income are as
follows: 52 per cent for corporations without excess profits; 82 per
cent for those with excess profits until the combined tax reaches 70
per cent of net income, beyond which the rate holds at 70 per cent.
On individual incomes, the pre-Korea bracket rates were,
illustratively, 16.6 per cent on the first $2,000 of surtax net income,
44 per cent on the $16,000 to $18,000 bracket, 66 per cent on the
$50,000 to $60,000 bracket, and 82.1 per cent on incomes over
$200,000. Today the corresponding rates are 22.2 per cent, 56 per
cent, 77 per cent, and 92 per cent.14 The maximum effective rate
has risen from 77 to 88 per cent.
Do such rates as these stimulate wasteful business spending?
Clark's answer, and indeed, the customary answer, is "yes," on
the ground that out of each additional dollar spent, for example,
by a corporation, the government foots 52 or 70 or 82 cents of the
bill. Undoubtedly, when a business man can make "nest-feathering"
expenditures today on maintenance, improvements, and advertising
which cost him only 30 cents or 18 cents on the dollar but which
promise to increase his profits in the future when taxes leave him,
say, 50 or 60 cents on the dollar; he will be stimulated to spend. But
for the types of expenditures which promise no future income-the
"loose-living" expenditures of high expense accounts and the like-
the argument is more difficult to fathom. Such outlays promise little
more than a bloated expenditure structure which will in due time
weaken the competitive position of those who indulge in them.
Moreover, is it not plausible that businessmen, rather than trying
to find ways to spend more dollars on the theory that the government
pays 82 or 70 per cent of any added cost may instead focus their
atention on the 18 or 30 cents that remains from each dollar? If
so, their effort might well be concentrated on earning as many of
these dollars as possible to maintain profits after taxes at satis-
factory levels.
Turning to the incentive argument, where the individual income
tax rates come more directly into play, one finds the essential
questions to be: how does the individual react to rates of 22.2,
14. The rate given operate fully only for single persons; because of in-
come splitting, married couples filing joint returns pay lower bracket rates,
in effect, on surtax net incomes above $2,000. For example, between $16,000
and $18,000, their marginal rate is now 38 per cent rather than 56 per cent.
At $50,000 to $52,000, it is 66 per cent instead of 77 per cent.
[Vol. 36:864
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56, and 77 per cent on his additional income, and how many persons
pay at the various marginal rates?
From one point of view, the higher the marginal rate of tax, the
greater is the stimulus to reduce one's work and increase one's
leisure and, perhaps more important, to substitute untaxed for
taxed work wherever possible. For example, the taxpayer may gain
by painting his house or keeping a garden rather than putting in
overtime on his job since the overtime is taxable, while the work
for himself is not. Vhether he substitutes leisure for work, or less
efficient for more efficient work, in either case, the economy suffers
a loss in total output (though this is not the same as saying that the
sum total of human happihess has necessarily been lessened).
From another point of view, there may be a good reason for
doing just the reverse, namely, for converting leisure into work.
If higher taxes cut down the income to which the individual has
been accustomed or which he aims to achieve, he may work just
that much harder to restore his income. He may work longer hours
at his job or do more things for himself around the house. In either
case, the higher taxes-given a fully employed economy as we
have today-lead to a gain in output (though not necessarily in
happiness).
Unfortunately, no firm evidence exists to establish which effect
predominates-the negative "substitution effect" which is a function
of marginal rates of tax or the positive "income effect" which is a
function of average rates of tax. To be sure, a study made at the
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration concludes
that "for the most part, with considerable exceptions, businessmen
are currently working as hard under high tax rates as they did
under low tax rates. . . ."I" But for the great mass of wage and
salary earners, we have little more in the way of evidence than
assertions that absenteeism, unwillingness to work overtime, re-
luctance to change jobs, and the like can be laid at the door of the
income tax. Before accepting these assertions, one should examine
the distribution of taxpayers by tax brackets. Figures presented by
the Treasury at the hearings on the 1951 Act show that the incomes
of 44.9 million out of the 51.7 million individual income taxpayers
do not reach beyond the first surtax bracket,16 in other words, are
taxable at a marginal rate of only 22.2 per cent. Taxes which leave
workers over 75 cents out of each additional dollar of earnings are
15. Sanders, Effects of Taxation on Incentives, 25 (1951).
16. Revente Revision of 1951, Hearings before the Conmittee on Ways
and Means, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, p. 25.
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not likely to discourage their work significantly and may even
stimulate additional work to replace lost income.'7
In brief, then, although inccme taxes at present rates undoubt-
edly have adverse effects on incentives, there are substantial off-
setting favorable effects. How much farther taxes can be pushed
before the adverse effects become prohibitively great is a matter of
judgment, though it seems reasonable to conclude that we are not
yet close to the economic limits of taxation in general and income
taxation in particular.
Equity Considerations
The most serious misgivings concerning further reliance on
the individual income arise, in my opinion, in the area of social
justice. Longstanding imperfections of the tax base and tax ad-
ministration have on one hand been magnified by higher rates and
lower exemptions and have on the other hand been compounded by
a phantasmagoria, as Mr. O'Byrne would put it, of new inroads
on the base and progressivity of the tax. The Revenue Act of 1951
is merely the most recent offender in the series of actions which
have undermined the theoretical fairness of this tax.
For example, when Congress reclassified several income items
as capital gains, it was merely taking a further step in what is
perhaps the most striking development of tax avoidance in the past
ten years. It began in 1942 with the lowering of the ceiling rate on
capital gains to 25 per cent, the shortening of the holding period to
6 months, and the reclassification of certain business assets as
"capital assets." It continued in 1943 and 1950 with the conferring
of capital gains treatment on timber and stock options. At the ceiling
rate of 26 per cent (after a token increase of one per cent in the
1951 Act), the capital gains treatment is a powerful tax avoidance
magnet for incomes which would otherwise be taxable at rates of
70, 80, or even 90 per cent.
Another device which the Act paid its respects to is the splitting
of large incomes into small pieces. By easing taxpayer access to
family partnership treatment, and by giving semi-splitting to heads
of households, it also transferred a substantial amount of income
17. Of course, income taxes are not the only ones which cut into the
worker's incentive. Any tax, including sales and excise taxes, which cuts
down the size of the bundle of goods which the worker can buy with a given
amount of additional income will have similar effects to those discussed here
in terms of the income tax. If it is true, however, that the closer the rela-
tionship between the tax and the reward for the effort expended, the sharper
the impact on that effort, then the influence of other taxes on incentives
will be weaker than that of the income tax.
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from higher into lower brackets. Quite apart from the objections on
equity grounds that these provisions violate equity by treating
differently persons who are in essentially the same economic cir-
cumstances, they violate progressivity, maintaining its form but
sapping its substance.
Overly generous or inappropriate exclusions, deductions and
exemptions are another means of escape from income tax liabilities.
Some may be necessary in the interests of simplification, e.g., the
granting of full-year exemptions for part-year dependency and the
exclusion of a dependent's income (raised from $500 to $600 in
1951). Others, like the special treatment of income of members
of the Armed Forces and the deduction for medical expenses, both
liberalized by the 1951 Act, are defended on grounds of social
policy. The granting of additional exemption to the aged and blind
in 1948 was also so defended. Apart from the usual objections to
using the tax mechanism as the instrument for granting subsidies,
aggravated by the fact that the benefits of exclusions, deductions
or exemptions rise with income under progressive rates, Professor
Surrey has suggested that if Congress succumbs to each plausible
case made for extra exemption (e.g., for physically handicapped
persons), "Js]uch a course is bound to result in the income tax
exemption sections' resembling the benefit provisions of an acci-
dent insurance policy."' s
In many ways, opening the percentage depletion gates to let in a
long procession of additional minerals was the 1951 Act's crassest
assault on principles of equity in taxation. In the face of the Adminis-
tration's renewed plea to narrow this $750-million-a-year loophole,
Congress broadened its coverage materially.
Even without attempting a complete catalogue of defects in
the income tax,"" one cannot avoid at least brief reference to the
serious problem of evasion and underreporting of individual in-
comes. In many ways, this is the worst breach of all in the equity
of the income tax because it leads to striking and unintended tax
differentials among various sources of income. A much higher
percentage of liabilities is actually collected on wages and salaries
than on interest and dividends because of the withholding provis-
ions. Yet, the Senate in 1951 struck down a provision of the House
18. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-the Revenue Act of
1948, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1103 (1948).
19. A more comprehensive discussion of these defects is presented
in the writer's Limitations of the Federal Net Income Tax, 7 The Journal
of Finance, 185-202 (1952).
1952]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
bill which would have collected $250 million more a year20 from
interest and dividends by means of an ingenius system developed
by the Treasury Department.21 Mainly to save dividend and interest
payors the modest compliance costs involved and to avoid certain
problems relating to savings bonds and small savings accounts,
Congress thus foregoes a quarter billion dollars of tax-evaded
revenue.
It is in their differential impact that the special concessions
and defects of the income tax give the greatest cause for concern.
A recent study gives orders of magnitude that are little short of
appalling. A comparison of U. S. Department of Commerce income
estimates with the amounts actually reported on income tax returns
filed for 1944, 1945, and 1946 showed that while 86 per cent of
total income and 95 per cent oF civilian wages and salaries were
accounted for on the returns, other sources of income fell far
short :22 only two-thirds of "interest, dividends, and fiduciary income
appeared; likewise, only two-thirds of farm and other business and
professional income was covered ;23 rent, excluding roomer-boarder
income, was little more than two-fifths reported. Even if one grants
that part of the gap between Commerce and tax return data results
from overestimates of the former, the underreporting indicated is
still a compelling cause for administrative and Congressional action.
.Conclusion
In condemning the defects of the income tax-and Congress
for worsening some and refusing to remove others-I do not mean
to imply that this tax is no longer the best instrument of social and
economic policy that the field of taxation has to offer. Nor do I
20. U. S. Treasury, op. cit. supra note 1, at 475.
21. Using dividends as an illustration, the system may be summarized
as follows: the corporation would withhold a flat 20 per cent of its total
dividend payments and forward the resulting amount to the Treasury with-
out making any breakdown by individual stockholders and without provid-
ing any withholding receipts to those stockholders. The latter, in filling out
their income tax returns, would report the actual amount of dividends re-
ceived, compute one-fourth of this amount and (a) add it to their taxable
income and (b) take credit for this amount as withheld tax.
22. Selma F. Goldsmith, "Appraisal of Basic Data Available for Con-
structing Income Size Distributions." Part VI in 13 Studies, Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research,
301-4 (1951).
23. For 1945, the one year for which the farm and non-farm elements
were separated, the startling result was that "only 36 per cent of farm
income was reported on tax returns . . . as against 87 per cent of non-
farm entrepreneurial income."
(Vol. 36:864
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overlook the courage of Congress in enacting $14 billion of addi-
tional taxes on individual and corporate1ILaemrn within 18 months
after Korea. But the growing disparities and special concessions
which now mar the individual income tax threaten its right to the
position of "backbone of our tax system." While no final judgment
can be made without knowledge of the alternatives open at any
given time, this brief analysis strongly suggests first, that much of
the current concern and lament over the level of taxation should
be redirected to its structure and, second, that the individual income
tax base should be improved and restored before proceeding with
further changes in rates and exemptions.
